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Abstract 
Humans are inherently curious creatures, continuously seeking out information about future 
outcomes. Such advance information is often valuable, potentially allowing people to select 
better courses of action. In non-human animals, this drive for information can be so strong 
that they forego food or water to find out a few seconds earlier whether an uncertain option 
will provide a reward. Here, we assess whether people will exhibit a similar sub-optimal 
preference for advance information. Participants played a card-flipping task where they were 
probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay. 
During this delay, participants could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity 
immediately. This choice to find out early did not influence the eventual outcome. 
Participants preferred to find out early about 80% of the time when the information was free; 
they were even willing to incur an expense to get advance information about the eventual 
outcome. The expected magnitude of the outcome, however, had little impact on the 
likelihood of finding out early. These results suggest that humans, like animals, value non-
instrumental information and will pay a price for such information, independent of its utility.   
 
Keywords: sub-optimal choice, curiosity, information, decision-making, gambling  
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Costly curiosity: People pay a price to resolve an uncertain gamble early 
Many animals are inherently curious, information-seeking creatures. Animals often 
gather information in close to an optimal fashion, where such information can lead to better 
reward harvests in the future (e.g., Charnov, 1976; Krebs et al., 1978). When faced with 
delayed, probabilistic rewards, however, many animals behave in a significantly sub-optimal 
manner. They sometimes prefer an informative option that reveals immediately whether the 
reward will pay off eventually, even if that information cannot be acted upon, and even to the 
point of giving up food or water to find out early (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2015; Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009; Dunn & Spetch, 1990; McDevitt et al., 2018; Pisklak et al., 2015; 
Spetch et al., 1990; Stagner & Zentall, 2010; see McDevitt et al., 2016; Zentall, 2016 for 
reviews). The costs for obtaining such non-instrumental information can be broad, including 
food, water, energy, and time. In these cases, the animals seem to be behaving as though the 
information about future outcome is in itself rewarding. 
One striking example of such suboptimal behaviour comes from experiments with 
pigeons working for signalled or unsignalled rewards (Dunn & Spetch, 1990; see also Spetch 
et al., 1990; 1994). In these experiments, pigeons were trained to choose between an option 
that led to food after a delay 100% of the time and a second option that led to food after the 
same delay only 50% of the time. In the unsignalled condition, when there were no additional 
cues, the pigeons, unsurprisingly, showed almost exclusive preference for the optimal 100% 
option. In the signalled condition, however, additional cues were provided immediately after 
choice that indicated whether or not food would be available after the delay on that trial. In 
this case, pigeons showed up to a 50-60% preference for the sub-optimal 50% rewarded 
option–with a stronger preference for the suboptimal option with longer delays (Spetch et al., 
1990; see also McDevitt et al, 2018). Similar sub-optimal choices have been observed with a 
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range of other probabilities (e.g., Stagner & Zentall, 2010) and in several other species, 
including starlings (Vasconcelos et al., 2015) and monkeys (Blanchard et al., 2015). 
 Like other animals, humans also prefer to know in advance about future positive 
events (Lowenstein, 1987; Golman & Lowenstein, 2018). For example, in a pair of recent 
experiments where the rewards were images of attractive female models, people showed a 
strong preference to have information in advance about these rewards, a tendency which 
increased as the waiting time grew longer (Iigaya et al., 2016; Zhu et al., 2017). One possible 
explanation for this preference is that animals like signals for good news, but disregard 
signals for bad news (e.g., McDevitt et al., 2016). Similarly, when learning from such 
rewards, people tend to weight more heavily the positive information, and disregard negative 
information (Kuzmanovic et al., 2018; Lefebvre et al., 2017). This preference for good news 
in people may derive from the savouring of future rewards, whereby people gain anticipatory 
utility from the experience preceding the actual reward (Loewenstein, 1987). Thus, knowing 
in advance about a future reward is preferable because that knowledge can be savoured, such 
as when people report a preference to kiss their favourite movie star with a delay of three 
days, rather than immediately. In contrast, people will avoid information about negative 
outcomes (e.g., distressful images; Zhu et al., 2017) as though they gain negative anticipatory 
utility from the potential dread elicited by bad news about future aversive outcomes 
(Charpentier et al., 2018; Golman et al., 2017; Karlsson et al., 2009). 
In a probabilistic reward task similar to what has been used with monkeys (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009), people also preferred to get advance, but non-instrumental, 
information about future rewards (Bennett et al., 2016; Brydevall et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
people even paid a significant monetary cost for that information, while exhibiting sensitivity 
to the cost of that information. When information was free, people were willing to obtain it 
on average 90% of the time. As the cost of the information increased, the proportion of times 
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participants paid for information decreased monotonically in the opposite direction to the 
cost, with the lowest point at 20% (Bennett, et al., 2016). In a recent study, people were even 
willing to endure the risk of shocks to discover the secret behind a magic trick they had 
observed (Lau et al., 2018). 
As with the pigeons above, this willingness to pay a cost for obtaining non-
instrumental information might at first glance seem suboptimal. These choices, however, 
were observed in situations deliberately constructed for information to be non-instrumental 
and perhaps reflect psychological mechanisms that would otherwise be adaptive. In different 
contexts, such a strong bias towards information gathering and exploration can actually lead 
to optimal behaviours, either at the individual level or at a societal level (Hills et al., 2015; 
Wilson et al., 2014a; Vasconcelos et al., 2015). In the experimental context with humans, 
perhaps participants were bored or disinterested and gained utility from simple engagement 
with the task, even if the only engagement resulted in an explicit cost or penalty (see Wilson 
et al., 2014b). 
Here, similar to Bennett et al. (2016), we designed an experiment to further assess 
when and how people are willing to pay for information that does not have direct 
instrumental value—but can merely satisfy their curiosity a little earlier. In a virtual slot 
machine task (see Fig 1), participants had to choose between revealing in advance the identity 
of up to three different cards, or waiting five seconds until the cards were automatically 
revealed. On most trials, revealing the cards before the end of the trial had a cost, and waiting 
was free. The reward on each round depended on the combination of cards obtained (see 
Table 1), and any action taken by the participants did not influence the outcome; therefore, all 
advanced information was strictly non-instrumental. In contrast to the work by Bennett et al. 
(2016), in the current experiment, there were multiple possible reward levels and different 
probabilities associated with different possible outcomes. This enhancement allowed us to 
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assess the impacts of reward magnitude and probability on information seeking. In the 
experiment, the first card was always free to reveal, so we could assess the impact of the 
reward indicated by that first card on the likelihood of revealing the second or third cards. 
Based on the significant sub-optimal choice displayed by non-humans when faced 
with delayed probabilistic rewards, we expected that participants would exhibit information-
seeking behaviour (i.e., reveal cards in advance). Second, we expected participants to be 
sensitive to the cost of the information: the higher the cost, the less often participants would 
choose to reveal a card in advance (Bennett et al., 2016). Third, if the magnitude of the 
reward impacts information-seeking, as would be the case if the information were being used 
to maximize rewards, then participants would be more likely to reveal a card in advance 
when a higher potential reward is available (see also Golman & Loewenstein, 2018). In 
contrast, recent research on curiosity in humans indicates that reward magnitude does not 
impact the degree of curiosity exhibited (van Lieshout et al., 2018). Applied here, only 
uncertainty about outcome would matter, and the potential reward magnitude on a trial should 
not impact the likelihood of revealing the cards early. 
Method 
Participants.  
75 participants (Mean age = 24; SD = 3.6; 3 undisclosed) were recruited through the 
University of Warwick (Coventry, UK) SONA system for participant recruitment. 
Participants consisted of 22 males, 49 females, 2 neither gender, and 2 undisclosed gender. 
Written informed consent was given by all participants prior the study. Ethical approval was 
provided through the psychology department at the University of Warwick. Participants were 
paid a show-up fee of £2 plus a variable payment of £3 to £6 based on choices. The average 
total pay including the show-up fee was £7.73 (SD = £0.45).  
Materials and Stimuli. 
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The experiment was implemented in MATLAB 2017b (The MathWorks, Inc.; Natick, 
Massachusetts, US), using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard & Vision, 1997; 
Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). The experiment took place on a Windows desktop computer 
with a 32” monitor with resolution of 1920x1080 pixels. Annotated raw data, summary 
spreadsheets, and the full code for the experiment are available on the Open Science 
Framework: osf.io/kh8ps.  
 
Figure 1. (A) Screenshot of the stimuli at the beginning of each trial and (B) after the stimuli 
have been revealed on a trial with three different stimuli. 
Figure 1 shows screenshots of the task before and after the stimuli and rewards have 
been revealed. Stimuli were three different square cards with the back coloured in blue and 
white in an irregular pattern. The front of each card was one of the following images inspired 
by real-world slot machines: a yellow star, the number seven coloured in red, and a cherry 
with a leaf painted in red and green. The cards were aligned horizontally from left to right 
with a symmetrical space between them. A countdown timer at the top right corner of the 
screen displayed the remaining time in each round in seconds. Yellow coloured coins of one-
third of the scale of the cards, with symmetrical distance between among them, were 
displayed below the cards when a reward was received. The number of coins depended on the 
size of the reward: zero points showed no coins, 50 points showed one coin, 100 points 
showed two coins, 300 points showed three coins, and 500 points showed four coins.  
A B
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Design and Procedure   
The experiment was conducted in a computer laboratory at the University of Warwick 
during weekdays from 10:00 am to 4:30 pm in 30-minute sessions. Sessions had 3-9 
participants, each seated at their own computer.  
The main task consisted of 221 trials, including the first five which were practice 
trials and excluded from the data analysis, leaving 216 trials in the main analysis. On each 
trial, participants played a virtual card game where they were rewarded based on the cards on 
that trial. They had the option of revealing the cards earlier (and sometimes paying a cost to 
do so) or waiting 5 s to see the outcomes. Revealing the cards early had no effect on either 
the rewards to be displayed or the timing of the task, which was made explicit to participants. 
Basic instructions for the task were displayed for each participant on the computer 
screen prior to the beginning of the experiment. As shown in Figure 1A, at the start of each 
trial the backs of the three cards were shown in addition to a five-second countdown timer on 
top of the third card, which displayed the number of seconds until the trial ended. At the end 
of the trial, the identities of all the cards were revealed at the same time, automatically and at 
no cost. Participants had the option to sequentially reveal in advance (i.e., before the end of 
the trial) as many cards as they wish: 0, 1, 2, or 3 (all) by pressing a key on the keyboard. 
Each keypress revealed another card. When participants chose to reveal cards in advance, 
they were always revealed in the same order: left, centre, and then right. Otherwise, all cards 
were revealed at the same time at the end of the 5-s delay. 
Table 1. Task specification including card combination, points rewarded, and odds of 
occurrence  
Cards Points Odds 
 
H-H-H 
 
500 
 
1/27 
 
M-M-M 
 
300 
 
1/27 
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L-L-L 100 1/27 
 
Three Different 
 
50 
 
6/27 
 
Any other combination 
 
0 
 
18/27 
 
Note. H=High; M=Medium; L=Low. 
 
For each participant, the three card images (the number seven, a cherry, or a star; see 
Fig 1B) were randomly assigned to one of the following identities: H (High), M (Medium), or 
L (Low). Table 1 details how the card combinations mapped onto points rewarded. Getting 
three identical cards yielded the biggest rewards: three H cards = 500 points, three M cards = 
300 points, and three L cards = 100 points. Any combination of three different cards yielded 
50 points. Any other combination provided no reward.  
Four different cost levels were assigned with equal probability to each trial: 0, 5, 10, 
and 15 points. The cost level was communicated to the participants before the beginning of 
each trial and was also stated at the top of the cards during each trial (see Figure 1). The first 
card could always be revealed at no cost. The second and the third cards could be revealed by 
paying the cost level assigned to that particular trial.  
Excluding the practice trials, participants saw each condition exactly twice (216 trials/ 
[27 card identity permutations x 4 cost levels]). On each trial, the probability of obtaining 
three identical cards was 1/27 (see Table 1). Therefore, the total probability of getting any 
three identical cards and earning either 500, 300, or 100 points was 3/27. The probability of 
obtaining three cards with different identities was 6/27, which provided a reward of 50 points. 
Consequently, the probability of getting any other combination of cards and not getting a 
reward on that trial was 18/27 or 2/3.   
Participant payments depended on the total number of points they held at the end of 
the experiment. Points were converted to GBP at a fixed exchange rate (1630 pts = £1).  
Data Analysis 
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The primary dependent measure was the proportion of time that people revealed each 
of the cards. All descriptive statistics are provided with 95% confidence intervals across 
participants. The primary analyses were repeated-measures ANOVAs where .05 was taken as 
the nominal threshold for statistical significance. Inferential statistics were calculated using 
SPSS 24 for the Mac (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). All reported statistics were double-checked 
for consistency with statcheck.io. 
Results 
 
Figure 2.  Probability of revealing a card as a function of the order of the card and the cost 
of revealing a card. Opacity represents the cost, increasing from left to right in each sub-
panel. Error bars represent 95% CIs across participants. 
Figure 2 displays the proportion of times the card was revealed as a function of card 
number (first, second, or third) and cost (0-15). When the information was free (cost = 0), 
participants chose to find out early about the ensuing outcome around 80% of the time. They 
revealed the first card 81.3 ± 6.3%, the second card 77.0 ± 6.4%, and the third card 72.6 ± 
6.8% of the time. Moreover, on trials with a cost, participants were still willing to reveal the 
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cards between 9-25% of the time, pending the condition (see Fig 2). In total, participants 
sacrificed on average 7.4 ± 2.6% of their total earnings from the experiment to obtain 
advance information about the outcomes, even though this information could not improve 
their rewards.  
Despite these seemingly irrational selections, people were still cost sensitive, 
choosing to reveal cards less often when the cost for revealing was higher, even for the first 
card when the cost was always zero. This pattern was corroborated by a two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA (Card x Cost) where there was a main effect of both Card (F(2,148) = 
154.2, p < .001; h2p  = .68) and Cost (F(3,222) = 211.5, p < .001; h2p  = .74) as well as a 
significant interaction (F(6,444) = 86.0, p < .001; h2p  = .54). Pairwise comparisons 
confirmed reliable differences (all ps < .007) between all neighbouring pairs except for costs 
10 and 15 for the first card.  
Because of the sequential nature of the choices, some participants never had the 
opportunity to reveal the second or third cards for a given cost level (i.e., because they didn’t 
reveal the earlier cards). A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with zero flips treated as 
missing values for unobserved instances (with participants thus removed) yielded similarly 
robust results with a main effect of both Card (F(2,88) = 135.6, p < .001; h2p  = .76) and Cost 
(F(3,132) = 127.3, p < .001; h2p  = .74) as well as a significant interaction (F(6,264) = 66.6, p 
< .001; h2p  = .60). Pairwise comparisons still confirmed reliable differences (all ps < .006) 
between all neighbouring pairs except for costs 10 and 15 for the first card.  
As noted, the reveal probabilities for the second and third cards are bounded by the 
probabilities of the earlier cards, violating the ANOVA assumption of independence. Thus, as 
a further robustness check, to confirm the effect of cost sensitivity observed in Figure 1, we 
also separately analysed the conditional probabilities of revealing a card given that the 
previous card was revealed in three one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a 
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significant main effect of Cost for each card (First: F(3, 222) = 37.0, p < .001; h2p  = .33; 
Second: F(3, 213) = 217.8, p < .001; h2p  = .75; Third: F(3, 132) = 139.7, p < .001; h2p  = 
.76). Note how each subsequent card includes fewer participants (and thus degrees of 
freedom) as the conditional probability is only defined for cards where there was an 
opportunity to reveal the card, and some participants never revealed either the first or second 
card for some cost levels.  
 
Figure 3. Probability of revealing the second card given the cost and the potential reward 
magnitude, as indicated by the identity of the first card. Error bars represent 95% CIs across 
participants. 
Figure 3 shows how for the second card, there was no effect of potential reward 
magnitude, as indicated by the identity of the first card, on the probability of revealing the 
second card. The cost, however, made a big difference (as in Fig 2) whereby higher cost 
options were revealed less frequently for all reward magnitudes. There was a mild interaction 
between these two variables, reflecting a larger difference between the two highest costs (10 
and 15) in the high-magnitude option. These results were again corroborated with a 2x2 
Costly Curiosity 13 
repeated-measures ANOVA (Magnitude x Cost). There was no reliable effect of Magnitude 
(F(2,148) = .33, p =.72; h2p  = .004), a main effect of Cost (F(3,222) = 194.0, p < .001; h2p  = 
.724), and a marginally significant interaction (F(6,444) = 2.18, p = .044; h2p  = .029). 
 
Figure 4. Probability of revealing the third card as a function of the identities of the first two 
cards. Error bars represent 95% CIs across participants. 
Figure 4 shows how when the identities of the first and second cards were the same 
(i.e., H-H, M-M, and L-L) the probabilities of revealing the third card were significantly 
higher than when the identities of the cards were different (e.g., H-L, H-M). On average, 
participants revealed the third card 29.8 ± 5.0% of the time when the first two cards were the 
same, indicating a potential big win, but only 26.7 ± 3.8% of the time when the first two 
cards were different, indicating only a potential small (50-pt) win. The magnitude of the first 
card, however, made little difference, meaning that observing two stars in a row, two cherries 
in a row, or two sevens in a row yielded the same probability of revealing the third card. This 
pattern was corroborated with a 2x2 ANOVA (Card Match x Magnitude). There was a main 
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effect of Card Match (F(1,74) = 6.65, p =.012; h2p  = .082), but no effect of Magnitude 
(F(2,148) = .03, p =.97; h2p  = .000) and no interaction (F(2,148) = .60, p =.55; h2p  = .008). 
A follow-up analysis which only examined trials that followed learning (defined as at 
least 4 exposures to each cue-reward contingency) yielded qualitatively similar results for all 
three sets of analyses. 
Discussion 
In this study, people engaged in significant, sub-optimal, information seeking. They 
were willing to pay a cost for resolving a gamble early even though doing so did not 
influence the eventual outcome. They let their curiosity get the better of them—giving up 
nearly 8% of their total earnings in the experiment for this early information. These findings 
support the hypothesis that people like signals about potential good news, paralleling the sub-
optimal choice exhibited by other animals (e.g., McDevitt et al., 2016; Blanchard et al., 2015; 
Zentall & Stagner, 2011). People may perhaps even obtain subjective utility from savouring 
the advance information of the future rewarding event (Iigaya, 2016; Loewenstein, 1987). 
Notably, the magnitude of the upcoming reward had little impact on the likelihood of 
selecting early information (see Fig 3 and 4), in agreement with recent work on the triggers 
for curiosity (van Lieshout et al., 2018). This lack of sensitivity to magnitude suggests that 
some property of the information itself, rather than the outcomes it foretells, drives the sub-
optimal information seeking.  
 In the experiment, when only the identity of the first card was known, participants 
were clearly not sensitive to potential reward magnitude (see Fig 3). This result runs counter 
to one recent theory of information preferences, which predicts that the information-seeking 
is modulated by the importance of that information, as determined in part by the reward 
magnitude (Golman & Loewenstein, 2018). One possible explanation for this insensitivity is 
that there was too large of an information gap between what people knew (after one card) and 
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the final outcome (after three cards) to trigger people’s curiosity (Golman & Loewnstein, 
2018; Loewenstein, 1994). After one card, only 1/3 of the uncertainty was resolved, and there 
were still nine different possible outcomes, which even a further card would still not fully 
reduce to a certain outcome. On the other hand, participants exhibited some sensitivity to the 
magnitude of potential rewards when the identities of two cards were known (see Fig 4). At 
this point, 2/3 of the uncertainty was resolved, and there were only three possible different 
outcomes, which a further card would completely resolve. The smaller information gap (as 
compared to when only the identity of one card is known) could have more strongly triggered 
participant’s curiosity.  
When the identity of two cards was known, participants were partially sensitive to the 
magnitude of the future potential rewards. They were more likely to reveal cards when the 
potential reward was higher (500, 300, or 100 points) than the lowest potential reward (50 
points). The probability of revealing the third card, however, was similar among the three 
higher rewards (see Fig 4). This partial sensitivity to the magnitude of rewards could 
potentially be due to insufficient learning of the differences between the high-value rewards. 
Across the task, getting three different cards was experienced 48 times, whereas the result of 
getting three cards with the same image was experienced only eight times for each triplet of 
outcomes. Therefore, the lowest reward combination was experienced six times more often 
than each combination of the larger rewards.  
Another possibility is that perhaps participants were indeed indifferent to reward 
magnitude even for that third card, but the slight preference for information after two 
identical images emerged due a desire for pattern completion. People may have preferred the 
information early when it had a chance to complete the three-in-a-row pattern than when the 
first two images were different from each other. In other situations, people do exhibit 
preference for patterns and symmetry, as in getting the same image three times in a row, as 
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well as disgust for asymmetrical stimuli, such as obtaining three different pictures in a row 
(Enquist & Arak, 1994; Evans et al., 2012; Plonsky, Teodorescu, & Erev, 2015). Participants 
may have been willing to pay for the information as the pattern itself (not the potential 
reward) provided them with subjective utility. In the current experiment, value and pattern 
were confounded, but future work could reverse the ordering and assess whether people were 
indeed preferentially aiming for pattern completion. 
Despite the seemingly irrational payments for early information, people were still cost 
sensitive. They were significantly less willing to reveal information as the cost of the 
information increased (as in Bennett et al., 2016). Interestingly, people were even less willing 
to reveal the first, free card when subsequent cards had a cost. This shift could potentially be 
due to some confusion about the cost of that first card. Alternatively, one card alone is not 
very informative (it rules out two of the high-reward options, but that’s all), so participants 
may have been assessing the cost of revealing the whole sequence. They may even have been 
anticipating their future curiosity and limiting the cost of the sub-optimal choices their future 
selves would make—like a form of pre-commitment (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2001; Rachlin 
& Green, 1972). 
Curiosity is often an adaptive trait, prompting the gathering of information that may 
help improve future choices. Curiosity also amplifies learning and memory—leading to better 
memory for trivia questions (Kang et al., 2009) and even incidental faces (Gruber et al., 
2014). One defining feature of curiosity, however, is that it does not strictly depend on 
whether that knowledge can be applied or become useful in the future, but rather seems to be 
an intrinsic drive in itself (e.g., Kidd & Hayden, 2015). In our study, indeed, there was no 
possibility that the information gleaned would improve the reward harvest, yet people still 
were willing to incur a cost for that information. Several flavours of curiosity may have been 
involved in the information-seeking behaviour in this task, including diversive perceptual 
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curiosity—the desire to evade tedium—and epistemic curiosity, which is the wish to obtain 
knowledge for its own sake (e.g., Berlyne, 1954). The high degree of uncertainty in the task 
likely amplified the willingness to pay for information, as uncertainty correlates with 
curiosity (Kang et al., 2009), even if reward magnitude often does not (van Lieshout et al, 
2017; Figure 2).  
In the brain, curiosity elicits activity in midbrain regions overlapping with those 
involved in reward processing, such as the striatum (e.g., Gruber et al., 2014; Kang et al., 
2009; Lau et al., 2018; see Kidd & Hayden, 2015, for a review). Similarly, when monkeys 
can acquire information to resolve an uncertain gamble early, dopamine neurons, often 
thought to encode prediction errors (e.g., Schultz et al., 1997) are influenced both by the 
reward value and the informational value of upcoming stimuli (Bromberg-Martin & 
Hikosaka, 2009). This twin sensitivity to both rewards and information is paralleled during a 
similar task in the feedback-related negativity in humans (Brydevall et al., 2018). This direct 
overlap between reward and information, however, seems restricted to information about 
future positive outcomes, but not negative ones (e.g., Charpentier et al. 2018), suggesting a 
plausible mechanism as to why information about aversive outcomes may instead be avoided 
(Golman et al., 2017; Karlsson et al., 2009; Zhu et al., 2017). Overall, these results suggest 
that the brain processes extrinsic rewards and the value of non-instrumental information in 
the same set of overlapping neural structures—highlighting how curiosity and information-
seeking may be best understood as reward-driven processes.  
One limitation of the current work is that all the contingencies in the task had to be 
learned from experience. Though that makes the study more comparable to related animal 
work (e.g., McDevitt et al., 2016; Zentall, 2016), it raises the possibility that people did not 
fully understand the cue-outcome contingencies or the lack of an action-outcome 
contingency. In other areas of decision making under uncertainty, there can be wide 
Costly Curiosity 18 
differences in preference when people learn from their experience as opposed to making 
decisions based on explicit descriptions (Hertwig and Erev, 2009; Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). 
Future work could inform and train people on the underlying reward structure, rather than 
expecting them to learn them solely by experience. 
Early information is often valuable. Knowing in advance whether or not you will get a 
raise this year would be useful to plan your finances and to take all sort economic decisions, 
such as buying a new car, getting a different mortgage, or tightening your spending. And 
human and other animals, quite sensibly, will seek out information that better their future 
outcomes (Hills et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2014a). The current results, however, highlight the 
darker side of such information seeking. Humans are curious to the point that they are willing 
to pay a cost for useless information (see also Powdthavee & Riyanto, 2015), paralleling 
other animals who forego food and water just to find out a few seconds earlier whether a 
reward will be arriving (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2015; Spetch et al., 1990; Stagner & Zentall, 
2010). This broad comparative convergence suggests that the roots of this sub-optimal 
information-seeking lies in the shared fundamental mechanisms that drive reward-based 
choice.  
References 
Ariely, D., & Wertenbroch, K. (2002). Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: Self-
control by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13, 219-224. 
Bennett, D., Bode, S., Brydevall, M., Warren, H., & Murawski, C. (2016). Intrinsic valuation 
of information in decision making under uncertainty. PLoS Computational Biology, 
12, e1005020.  
Berlyne, D.E. (1954). A theory of human curiosity. British Journal of Psychology, 45, 180-
191.  
Costly Curiosity 19 
Blanchard, T. C., Hayden, B. Y., & Bromberg-Martin, E. S. (2015). Orbitofrontal cortex uses 
distinct codes for different choice attributes in decisions motivated by 
curiosity. Neuron, 85, 602-614. 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10, 433-436.  
Bromberg-Martin, E. S., & Hikosaka, O. (2009). Midbrain dopamine neurons signal 
preference for advance information about upcoming rewards. Neuron, 63, 119-126. 
Brydevall, M, Bennett, D., Murawski, C., Bode1, S. (2018). The neural encoding of 
information prediction errors during noninstrumental information seeking. Scientific 
Reports, 2018.  
Charnov, E. L. (1976). Optimal foraging, the marginal value theorem. Theoretical Population 
Biology, 9, 129-136. 
Charpentier, C. J., Bromberg-Martin, E. S., & Sharot, T. (2018). Valuation of knowledge and 
ignorance in mesolimbic reward circuitry. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 115(31), E7255-E7264. 
Dunn, R., & Spetch, M. L. (1990). Choice with uncertain outcomes: Conditioned 
reinforcement effects. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 53, 201-218. 
Enquist, M., & Arak, A. (1994). Symmetry, beauty and evolution. Nature, 372, 169-172.  
Evans, D. W., Orr, P. T., Lazar, S. M., Breton, D., Gerard, J., Ledbetter, D. H., . . . 
Batchelder, H. (2012). Human preferences for symmetry: Subjective experience, 
cognitive conflict and cortical brain activity. PloS One, 7, e38966.  
Golman, R., & Loewenstein, G. (2018). Information gaps: A theory of references regarding 
the presence and absence of information. Decision, 5, 143-164. 
Golman, R., Hagmann, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2017). Information avoidance. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 55, 96-135. 
Costly Curiosity 20 
Gottlieb, J., Oudeyer, P., Lopes, M., & Baranes, A. (2013). Information-seeking, curiosity, 
and attention: Computational and neural mechanisms. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
17(11), 583-593. 
Gruber, J. M., Gelman, B. D., & Ranganath, C. (2014). States of curiosity modulate 
hippocampus-dependent learning via the dopaminergic circuit. Neuron 84, 486-496. 
Hertwig, R., & Erev, I. (2009). The description–experience gap in risky choice. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 13, 517-523. 
Hills, T. T., Todd, P. M., Lazer, D., Redish, A. D., Couzin, I. D., & Group, C. S. R. (2015). 
Exploration versus exploitation in space, mind, and society. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 19, 46-54.  
Iigaya, K., Story, G. W., Kurth-Nelson, Z., Dolan, R. J., & Dayan, P. (2016). The modulation 
of savouring by prediction error and its effects on choice. eLife, 5, e13747.  
Kang, M. J., Hsu, M., Krajbich, I. M., Loewenstein, G., McClure, S. M., Wang, J. T.-y., & 
Camerer, C. F. (2009). The wick in the candle of learning: Epistemic curiosity 
activates reward circuitry and enhances memory. Psychological Science, 20(8), 963-
973.  
Karlsson, N., Loewenstein, G., & Seppi, D. (2009). The ostrich effect: Selective attention to 
information. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 38(2), 95-115. 
Kidd, C., and Hayden, B. Y (2015).The psychology and neuroscience of curiosity. Neuron, 
88(3), 449-460.  
Lau, J. K. L., Ozono, H., Kuratomi, K., Komiya, A., & Murayama, K. (2018). Hunger for 
knowledge: How the irresistible lure of curiosity is generated in the brain. 
bioRxiv, 473975. 
Kleiner, M., Brainard, D., Pelli, D., Ingling, A., Murray, R., & Broussard, C. (2007). What’s 
new in Psychtoolbox-3. Perception, 36(14), 1.  
Costly Curiosity 21 
Krebs, J. R., Kacelnik, A., & Taylor, P. (1978). Test of optimal sampling by foraging great 
tits. Nature, 275(5675), 27-31. 
Lefebvre, G., Lebreton, M., Meyniel, F., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., & Palminteri, S. (2017). 
Behavioural and neural characterization of optimistic reinforcement learning. Nature 
Human Behaviour, 1, 0067.  
Loewenstein, G. (1987). Anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption. The 
Economic Journal, 97, 666-684.  
Loewenstein, G. (1994). The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. 
Psychological Bulletin, 116, 75.  
Ludvig, E. A., & Spetch, M. L. (2011). Of black swans and tossed coins: Is the description-
experience gap in risky choice limited to rare events?. PloS ONE, 6, e20262. 
McDevitt, M. A., Dunn, R. M., Spetch, M. L., & Ludvig, E. A. (2016). When good news 
leads to bad choices. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 105, 23-40.  
McDevitt, M. A., Pisklak, J. M., Spetch, M., & Dunn, R. (2018). The influence of outcome 
delay on suboptimal choice. Behavioural Processes, 157, 279-285. 
Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice and self-control. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 17, 15-22. 
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: transforming 
numbers into movies. Spatial Vision, 10, 437-442.  
Pisklak, J. M., McDevitt, M. A., Dunn, R. M., & Spetch, M. L. (2015). When good pigeons 
make bad decisions: Choice with probabilistic delays and outcomes. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 104(3), 241-251. 
Powdthavee, N. & Riyanto, Y. E. (2015). Would you pay transparently usless advice? a test 
of boundaries of beliefs in the folly of predictions. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 97, 2, 257-272.  
Costly Curiosity 22 
Plonsky, O., Teodorescu, K., & Erev, I. (2015). Reliance on small samples, the wavy recency 
effect, and similarity-based learning. Psychological Review, 122, 621-647.  
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of prediction and 
reward. Science, 275, 1593-1599. 
Spetch, M. L., Belke, T. W., Barnet, R. C., Dunn, R., & Pierce, W. D. (1990). Suboptimal 
choice in a percentage-reinforcement procedure: Effects of signal condition and 
terminal-link length. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 53(2), 219-
234. 
Spetch, M., Mondloch, M., Belke, T., & Dunn, R. (1994). Determinants of pigeons’ choice 
between certain and probabilistic outcomes. Animal Learning & Behavior, 22, 239-
251.  
Stagner, J. P., & Zentall, T. R. (2010). Suboptimal choice behavior by pigeons. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 17, 412-416. 
Vasconcelos, M., Monteiro, T., & Kacelnik, A. (2015). Irrational choice and the value of 
information. Scientific Reports, 5, 13874. 
van Lieshout, L. L., Vandenbroucke, A. R., Müller, N. C., Cools, R., & de Lange, F. P. 
(2018). Induction and relief of curiosity elicit parietal and frontal activity. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 2816-17. 
Wilson, R. C., Geana, A., White, J. M., Ludvig, E. A., & Cohen, J. D. (2014a). Humans use 
random and directed exploration to solve the explore-exploit trade-off. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 2074-2081. 
Wilson, T. D., Reinhard, D. A., Westgate, E. C., Gilbert, D. T., Ellerbeck, N., Hahn, C., ... & 
Shaked, A. (2014b). Just think: The challenges of the disengaged  
mind. Science, 345(6192), 75-77. 
Costly Curiosity 23 
Zentall, T. R. (2016). When humans and other animals behave irrationally. Comparative 
Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 11, 25-48. 
Zentall, T. R., & Stagner, J. (2011). Maladaptive choice behaviour by pigeons: an animal 
analogue and possible mechanism for gambling (sub-optimal human decision-making 
behaviour). Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 278, 
1203-1208.  
Zhu, J., Xiang, W., & Ludvig, E. A. (2017). Information seeking as chasing anticipated 
prediction errors. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society Meeting (CogSci-17), 
39, 3658-3663. 
 
  
Costly Curiosity 24 
Acknowledgments 
The data in this paper were included in the first author's M.Sc. dissertation at Warwick 
University and were presented at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Comparative Cognition 
Society in Melbourne, FL, USA. 
  
Costly Curiosity 25 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. (A) Screenshot of the stimuli at the beginning of each trial and (B) after the stimuli 
have been revealed on a trial with three different stimuli. 
Figure 2.  Probability of revealing a card as a function of the order of the card and the cost of 
revealing a card. Opacity represents the cost, increasing from left to right in each sub-panel. 
Error bars represent 95% CIs across participants. 
Figure 3. Probability of revealing the second card given the cost and the potential reward 
magnitude, as indicated by the identity of the first card. Error bars represent 95% CIs across 
participants. 
Figure 4. Probability of revealing the third card as a function of the identities of the first two 
cards. Error bars represent 95% CIs across participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
